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[W]e deal with a person who is not equal to the police in
knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the ques-
tions and answers being recorded and who is unable to know
how to protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his
constitutional rights.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The privilege against self-incrimination is inscribed in the Fifth
t J.D. Candidate 2001, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., 1965, St. Jo-
seph College, West Hartford, Connecticut. The author dedicates this article to her
mother Rose A. Shurko, for her legacy of faith and self-reliance.
1. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (commenting on juvenile
interrogations).
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Amendment of the United States Constitution2 and is traceable to some of
the earliest laws of civilized man.3 When the Minnesota Supreme Court
decided State v. Tibiatowski,4 it ruled admissible an incriminatory statement
obtained from a juvenile who was not informed of this privilege prior to
questioning.5 This note will explore the Tibiatowski court's analysis in light
of relevant statutes and precedent that the court failed to consider in
reaching its decision.
In Tibiatowski, the Minnesota Supreme Court failed to consider
North Dakota laws controlling North Dakota Department of Corrections
Human Relations Counselor Connie Wheeler in her capacity as Jeremy
Daniel Tibiatowski's case manager.' North Dakota's official policy and the
North Dakota Interstate Compact on Juveniles required Wheeler to coop-
erate fully in sending a delinquent juvenile, such as Tibiatowski, to an-
7other state for custody upon the other state's request. When Wheeler
questioned Tibiatowski, she knew that Minnesota had requested a hold
on him.9 The Minnesota hold was a restraint in addition to his pre-
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual serv-
ice, in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation.
Id. (emphasis added).
3. See generally Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, In the Begin-
ning: The Talmudic Rule Against Self-Incrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 955, 966-74
(1988) (describing Talmudic law and its foundation).
4. 590 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1999).
5. See id. at 311.
6. See id. at 307 (noting that Wheeler was Tibiatowski's North Dakota De-
partment of Juvenile Services case manager); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-21-01
(1991) (stating that the Division ofJuvenile Services is created within the Depart-
ment of Corrections and Rehabilitation and its chief administrative officer is ap-
pointed by the director of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation); see
id. at § 27-21-09 (stating that the Division of Juvenile Services is to cooperate with
the North Dakota juvenile courts); see id. at § 27-22-01 (stating that North Dakota's
policy is "to cooperate fully with other states in returning juveniles to such other
state whenever their return is sought"); see id. at § 27-22-02 (stating that under the
Interstate Compact on Juveniles, a delinquent juvenile may be sent to another
state for custody upon the other state's request).
7. See N.D. CENT. CODE§ 27-22-01 to-02 (1991).
8. See Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d at 307 (stating that Wheeler arranged an in-
terview with Tibiatowski at the Cass County Juvenile Detention Center in Fargo,
North Dakota, on February 13, 1996).
9. See id. (stating that Wheeler received a message on February 13, 1996,
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existing North Dakota incarceration for a prior charge. ° Due to the addi-
tional restraint, Tibiatowski was entitled to a warning from Wheeler con-
cerning his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution,11 as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Miranda v. Arizona. Because Wheeler failed to give Tibiatowski a
Miranda warning," the Minnesota Supreme Court erred in admitting his
confession into evidence.
II. HISTORY
Jewish Talmudic law recognizes the accused's absolute privilege
against self-incrimination in criminal cases. 4 In about the second centuryS 15 ..
of the current era, the Mishnah codified traditions dating back many
centuries, including the privilege against self-incrimination. Further, to
convict a person of a criminal charge, the Book of Deuteronomy requires• . 17
the testimony of at least two witnesses, and the accused himself may not
be one of those witnesses. 8
While British Colonial governments in America constitutionally pro-
from Detective Richard Norwig of the Moorhead (Minnesota) Police Department
stating that Minnesota "wanted a hold onJeremy").
10. See id. at 306 (noting that his North Dakota incarceration was for charges
unrelated to this appeal).
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be witness against himself.").
12. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
13. See Tibiatowsk, 590 N.W.2d at 307 (reporting that, throughout their inter-
view, Wheeler failed to give Tibiatowski a Miranda warning, although she sug-
gested that he talk to an attorney after he confessed to his participation in a con-
venience store robbery).
14. See Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 956 (observing that Talmudic
law barred the accused's confessions in most criminal and quasi-criminal cases in
or out of court, regardless of whether the confession was compelled or voluntary).
15. See id. at 968 n.48 (explaining that the word Mishnah stems from a verb
meaning "to repeat," suggesting oral tradition learned by repetition).
16. See id. at 967-68 (describing the Mishnah as a codification of basic Jewish
law derived from Biblical text and orally transmitted law).
17. See Deuteronomy 19:15 (KingJames) ("One witness shall not rise up against
a man for any iniquity, or for any sin, in any sin that he sinneth: at the mouth of
two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall the matter be estab-
lished.").
18. See id. The literal wording of Deuteronomy 19:15 still would seem to allow
the accused to be one of the two required witnesses. See id. However, Deuteronomy
24:16 later states: "The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither
shall the children be put to death for the fathers: every man shall be put to death
for his own sin." Id. at 24:16. See also Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 975-
76. Deuteronomy 24:16 is interpreted to exclude testimony by relatives, and since a
man is considered to be his own closest relative, these two Deuteronomy texts to-
gether provide the scriptural basis for the Talmudic rule against admitting a per-
son's own confession in evidence against him. See id. at 976-77.
2000]
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tected the privilege against imposed self-incrimination,'9 the privilege
finds its roots in England as a rule of evidence.2 0 The earliest documenta-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination in England came during the
Restoration period following the seventeenth-century Cromwellian pe-
riod. 1  Religious and political independents, including Puritans and
Quakers, claimed the privilege for their personal and religious convictions
when questioned about their loyalty to the British king. American colo-
nists, many of whom left England seeking liberty of conscience and relig-
ion, included the privilege in their earliest colonial and state constitu-
25tions.
Those colonists, in establishing their national governing document,
purposefully included the Fifth Amendment in the Bill of Rights of the
U.S. Constitution, guaranteeing that the accused cannot be compelled to
give evidence against himself. The U.S. Supreme Court also has held
that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause excludes using involun-
tary confessions against criminal defendants.2526
In Malloy v. Hogan, the Court first applied this Fifth Amendment
27
right to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In the prece-
19. See generally R. Carter Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REv. 763, 763 n.1 (1935) (de-
scribing the history of the privilege against self-incrimination).
20. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896) (tracing the need for
protections against self-accusation in England prior to the expulsion of the Stuarts
from the British throne in 1688).
21. See R.H. Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Role
of the European lus Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 964-67 (1990) (noting that me-
dieval canon law, dating to the early thirteenth century, supports the privilege).
22. See Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment and Its Critics, 19
CARDOZO L. REv. 821, 841-42 (1997) (noting that a Puritan, Adrian Scroop, and a
Quaker, William Penn, claimed the privilege against incriminating themselves
when questioned about their loyalty to the British crown).
23. See generally THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONsTITUIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS,
AND OTHER ORGANIc LAws OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERIcA (F. Thorpe ed., 1909).
24. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."); see also Brown, 161 U.S. at 597
("[T] he States, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused
person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in England was a
mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a
constitutional enactment.").
25. See Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191,197-98 (1957) (holding that, in light of
the accused's incarceration in isolation for a week of questioning, the obtained
confessions were not voluntary and using them denied due process, notwithstand-
ing the absence of physical brutality or long, continued interrogation).
26. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
27. See id. at 6; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
[Vol. 26:1
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28
dent-setting case of Miranda v. Arizona, the Court set forth a series of29
clear rules regarding custodial questionings. Miranda requires that, be-
fore custodial questioning, a law enforcement official must warn the per-
son to be questioned (1) that he has the right to remain silent,' (2) that
any statement he makes may be used in criminal proceedings againstS 31 .32
him, (3) that he has the right to counsel, and (4) that, if he cannot pay,
counsel will be appointed for him.3 The Miranda court emphasized that
"when an individual is taken into custody or deprived of his freedom by
the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the
privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized."
34
In re Gault 5 applied this privilege against self-incrimination to juve-
nile court proceedings, regardless of whether courts consider such pro-
ceedings "civil" or "criminal" in nature.36 In Fare v. Michael C.,37 the Court
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
28. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
29. See id. at 467-73.
30. See id. at 467-69 ("[I]f a person in custody is to be subjected to interroga-
tion, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the
right to remain silent.").
31. See id. at 469 ("The warning of the right to remain silent must be accom-
panied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the indi-
vidual in court.").
32. See id. at 469-73 ("[W]e hold that an individual held for interrogation
must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have
the lawyer with him during interrogation ... ").
33. See id. at 473.
34. Id. at 478.
35. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
36. See id. at 42-57.
Against the application to juveniles of the right to silence, it is argued
thatjuvenile proceedings are "civil" and not "criminal," and therefore the
privilege should not apply. It is true that the statement of the privilege in
the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the States by reason of the
Fourteenth Amendment, is that no person "shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." However, it is also clear
that the availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of pro-
ceeding in which its protection is involved, but upon the nature of the
statement or admission and the exposure that it invites. The privilege
may, for example, be claimed in a civil or administrative proceeding, if
the statement is or may be inculpatory.
Id. at 49.
37. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
2000]
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declared that the admissibility of a juvenile's self-incriminating statement
into evidence must include an inquiry into whether the juvenile "know-
ingl and voluntarily decided to forego" the right to silence and to coun-
sel.
Research indicates that juveniles, to clearly benefit from Miranda's
constitutional safeguards, may require a warning expressed in language
they clearly comprehend.
III. CASE DESCRIPTION
In January 1996, Jeremy Tibiatowski was seventeen years old and had
a history of trouble with the law.4° His troubles were about to take on con-
stitutional proportions. He had been in the legal and physical custody of
the North Dakota Department of Corrections Division of Juvenile Services
(DJS) for about a year, but Tibiatowski had been "on the run" for most of
41
that time. Connie Wheeler was his DJS case manager and had spoken
with him in that capacity about thirty times. 42 Tibiatowski apparently de-
43
veloped a relationship of trust with her. Wheeler, however, was an em-
ployee of the North Dakota Department of Corrections." She knew or
should have known of the North Dakota laws governing her position.
North Dakota law obligated her to cooperate with North Dakota authori-
ties and authorities of other states by returning juveniles to another state's
custody at that state's request.45
38. See id. at 724-25 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475-77).
39. See Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empiri-
cal Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REv. 1134, 1160 (1980). Manyjuveniles, even those 16 years
old depending on their intelligence quotient scores, insufficiently comprehend
constitutional protections against self-incrimination. See id. Juveniles should be
made aware of these rights in language they can understand to assure that their
statements are voluntary. See id. at 1161.
40. See State v. Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d 305, 307 (Minn. 1999); see also Brief
for Respondent at 5-6, State v. Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1999) (No. C2-
97-834) (alleging that Tibiatowski snatched a purse while on the run from the cus-
tody of the North Dakota Department of Corrections Division of Juvenile Serv-
ices).
41. See Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d at 307; see also Brief for Respondent at 5-6,
Tibiatowski, (No. C2-97-834) (noting that, in January 1996, Tibiatowski was in the
custody of the North Dakota Department of Corrections for about a year and es-
caped in late January 1995 from the facility where he was placed).
42. See Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d at 307 (noting that Wheeler and Tibiatowski
had conversed both in person and by telephone).
43. See id. (reporting that Wheeler had been Tibiatowski's case manager for a
year; that at the omnibus hearing, Tibiatowski stated that he cooperated with
Wheeler because he "wanted to be honest with her," and that he recognized that
honesty with her was part of his "obligation as a person on probation").
44. See id. (identifying Wheeler as a North Dakota Department of Corrections
DJS Human Relations Counselor).
45. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-21-09 (1991) (stating that the Division of Juve-
[Vol. 26:1
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On January 31, 1996, two young men, one carrying a shotgun,
robbed a Moorhead, Minnesota, Travel Mart convenience store. A third
accomplice drove the escape vehicle.47 Three eyewitnesses to the robbery
were unable to describe the gunman.4s
On February 3, 1996, Tibiatowski was picked up on North Dakota
charges unrelated to the January 31 robbery and placed in the Cass
County (North Dakota) Juvenile Detention Center. When Wheeler
learned that Tibiatowski was in custody, she made an appointment to see
him at the detention center late on the afternoon of February 13. 50 She
informed Tibiatowski that their conversation would include discussion of
his whereabouts and activities while on the run."'
By coincidence, Moorhead Police Detective Richard Norwig inter-
viewed two suspects early in the day of February 13 in connection with the
Moorhead convenience store robbery. 52 The two suspects identified the
gunman as "Jeremy" or "Bud," but were unable to provide his last name or
other positive identification.53 After Norwig completed questioning the
robbery suspects, he called Wheeler and left a message that Minnesota
authorities wanted a hold on Tibiatowski.54 At that time, Norwg knew
only that the alleged gunman's name might be "Jeremy" or Bud.
When Wheeler received Norwig's message, she reasonably suspected
Tibiatowski had been involved in something criminal recently in Minne-56
sota. She knew about the convenience store robbery but reportedly did
nile Services is to cooperate with the North Dakota juvenile courts); see id. § 27-22-
01 (stating that North Dakota's policy is to cooperate fully with other states in re-
turning juveniles to another state whenever such return is sought); see id. § 27-22-
02 (stating that under the Interstate Compact on Juveniles, a delinquent juvenile
may be sent to another state for custody, upon the other state's request).
46. See Tibiatowsk, 590 N.W.2d at 306 (reporting that the gunman, while de-
manding money, pumped the gun as if chambering a round of ammunition).
47. See id. at 307 (noting that the driver of the escape vehicle was the only
adult involved in the crime; Tibiatowski and the other accomplice were juveniles).
48. See id. at 306 (reporting that eyewitnesses provided only a general descrip-
tion of the robbers); see also Brief for Respondent at 7, State v. Tibiatowski, 1999
WL 110847 (Minn. Mar. 4, 1999) (No. C2-97-834) (noting that the only descrip-
tion of the gunman was by his height and that an eyewitness failed to identify
Tibiatowski in a photo lineup).
49. See Tibiatowsk, 590 N.W.2d at 307.
50. See id.
51. See id. (noting that Wheeler also intended to discuss an upcoming hearing
and Tibiatowski's placement for a previous offense).
52. See id. (reporting that Moorhead, Minnesota, law enforcement authorities
learned on February 11, 1996, that two other suspects could have been involved in
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57
not connect Tibiatowski with that crime. She knew or should have
known that if she obtained information from Tibiatowski implicating him
in any illegal activities, North Dakota laws obligated her to convey that in-
58formation to appropriate law enforcement authorities. Once she re-
ceived Norwig's message, she also knew or should have known that North
Dakota's Interstate Compact on Juveniles 9 and North Dakota's official60
policy of cooperation with other states operated to place an additional
restraint on Tibiatowski's freedom. Before Wheeler saw Tibiatowski for
their February 13 afternoon meeting, she already was obligated to honor
Norwig's request for a hold on Tibiatowski and to deliver Tibiatowski to
Minnesota authorities.
During their meeting, Wheeler failed to inform Tibiatowski that
Minnesota police had contacted her and wanted to question him.6' She
failed to tell him that he now was under additional restraint from Minne-
sota authorities. 62 She failed to advise him of his constitutional rights un-
der Miranda.63 Wheeler recognized that Tibiatowski seemed quieter than
usual and bothered by something.64 When she asked, well into their con-
versation, if he wanted to tell her anything, he blurted out his involvement
65in the January 31 robbery. Tibiatowski then began asking Wheeler about
his "legal status."6 6 Only after she obtained his confession did Wheeler
advise Tibiatowski to talk to a lawyer.67
The next day, Wheeler reported Tibiatowski's incriminating state-
ment to Norwig, as she was obligated to do under North Dakota law.69
Tibiatowski's additional restraint resulted in his transfer to Minnesota
57. See id.
58. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-21-09, 27-22-01 (1991).
59. See id. § at 27-22-01 (permitting North Dakota authorities to send a delin-
quentjuvenile to another state for custody upon the other state's request).
60. See id. § at 27-21-09.
61. See Brief for Respondent at 6, State v. Tibiatowski, 1999 WL 110847
(Minn. Mar. 4, 1999) (No. C2-97-834).
62. See id.
63. See Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d at 307.
64. See id.
65. See id. (noting Wheeler's shock at Tibiatowski's confession and her sur-
prise at his use of a gun, which previously had not been part of his background).
66. See id.; see also Brief for Respondent at 7, Tibiatowski (No. C2-97-834)
("Jeremy asked Officer Wheeler what was going to happen to him.").
67. See Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d at 307 ("[W]hen respondent started asking
questions about his legal status, she told him that he needed to talk to an attor-
ney."). Even though Wheeler advised Tibiatowski to consult a lawyer when she re-
alized that he was incriminating himself, she still failed to apprise him of his
Miranda rights and at no time during the interview did she instruct him of his
privilege against self-incrimination. See id.
68. See id.
69. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-22-01 to -02 (1991).
[Vol. 26:1
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authorities. 0 Without Tibiatowski's statement, little evidence connected
him to the robbery or identified him as the gunman. 7 1 Three eyewitnesses
failed to describe the gunman in any detail. One eyewitness failed to
identify Tibiatowski even when shown a photo lineup including his pic-
ture. The two suspects that Norwig questioned identified Tibiatowski
74only after learning of his incriminating statement.
Tibiatowski was certified to stand trial in Minnesota as an adult on
the charge of first-degree aggravated robbery.7' At the omnibus hearing,
Judge Michael L. Kirk admitted Tibiatowski's statement to Wheeler into
76
evidence. Tibiatowski waived his right to a jury trial and Judge Kirk ad-
judged him guilty.77 The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, finding
Tibiatowski's statement inadmissible absent a valid Miranda warning.
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, reinstating
the trial court ruling. 79 Tibiatowski's sentence was fifty-eight months in
prison.8O
IV. ANALYSIS
The Minnesota Supreme Court considered three issues in Tibiatow-
ski:sl
1. When Wheeler questioned Tibiatowski at the North Dakota Juve-
nile Detention Center, was he under an additional custodial re-
straint, other than that relating to his previous charge?
2
2. Was Wheeler's questioning of Tibiatowski express questioning
70. See Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d at 307 (confirming that the next day Norwig
received Tibiatowski's confession and custody of Tibiatowski).
71. See id.
72. See id. at 306 ("None of the eyewitnesses were [sic] able to give more than
a general description of the robbers."); see also Brief for Respondent at 7, State v.
Tibiatowski, 1999 WL 110847 (Minn. Mar. 4, 1999) (No. C2-97-834) ("None of the
three eyewitnesses to the robbery could give a more detailed description.").
73. See Tibiatowsk, 590 N.W.2d at 306; see also Brief for Respondent at 7,
Tibiatowski (No. C2-97-834).
74. See Tibiatowsk4 590 N.W.2d at 307.
75. See id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.245, subd. 1 (1998)).
76. See id. at 307-08; see also State v. Tibiatowski, No. C2-97-834, 1999 WL
110847, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 1998), rev'd 590 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1999).
77. See Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d at 308; see also Brief for Respondent at 4, Tibia-
towski (No. C2-97-834).
78. See Tibiatowsk, 1999 WL 110847 at *2-3.
79. See Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d at 311.
80. See id. at 308 (following Tibiatowski's guilty plea, he received the pre-
sumptive sentence); see also Tibiatowski, 1999 WL 110847, at *4 (documenting his
sentence as the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines' presumptive 58-month prison
term).
81. See Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d at 308-11.
82. See id. at 308-09.
20001
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reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response and was his
response voluntary?8
3
3. What was Wheeler's official capacity at the time she questioned
Tibiatowski?8
A. Additional Custodial Restraint
As decided by Miranda, the Fifth Amendment protects persons from
being compelled to incriminate themselves in interrogations in which
their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way. The Tibiatow-
ski court held that there was "no evidence of restraint on the suspect's
freedom other than that to which the suspect was already subject by rea-
son of his custody for an unrelated offense .... This holding is unsup-
ported by the evidence.
1. Court Analysis of "Additional Restraint"
Although the parties stipulated that Tibiatowski was in custody, the
Minnesota Supreme Court correctly noted that both lower courts failed to
consider whether the circumstances of his custody included an additional
restraint requiring a Miranda warning from Wheeler.
8 7
The Tibiatowski court analyzed the facts in light of the "additional re-




Under Cervantes, a Miranda warning is required when custodial inter-
rogation significantly deprives the suspect of freedom of action or places
an additional imposition on freedom of movement. Cervantes was a
83. See id. at 309-10.
84. Seeid.at3l10-11.
85. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966). "The principles an-
nounced today deal with the protection which must be given to the privilege
against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police interroga-
tion while ... deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id.
"[W] hen an individual is... deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any sig-
nificant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-
incrimination is jeopardized." Id. at 478. "[T]he Constitution has prescribed the
rights of the individual when confronted with the power of government when it
provided in the Fifth Amendment that an individual cannot be compelled to be a
witness against himself." Id. at 479.
86. Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d at 309.
87. See id. at 308.
88. 589 F.2d 424, 428 (9th Cir. 1978).
89. 843 F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir. 1988).
90. 13 F.3d 1487, 1492 (11th Cir. 1994).
91. See Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 428 ("Thus, restriction is a relative concept, one
not determined exclusively by lack of freedom to leave. Rather, we look to some
act which places further limitations on the prisoner.").
[Vol. 26:1
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92
prison inmate who was moving to a different cell. The discovery of a
green odorless substance among Cervantes' possessions sparked a deputy
sheriffs questioning of him. Cervantes readily identified the substance94
as marijuana. Cervantes was under no additional restriction other than
that posed by his incarceration for a previous offense.95 The Cervantes
court ruled that no Miranda warning was required because such question-
ing merely enabled the officer to determine whether a crime had been
committed or was in progress.96
Under Leviston, "additional restraint" is evidenced by some further
restriction on the suspect's freedom of action.97 Leviston was incarcerated98
on previous charges when he initiated a police interview. During the in-
terview, Leviston attempted to cast suspicion on two innocent acquain-
tances for a robbery that Leviston had committed but for which he was
not incarcerated.9 When later confronted with evidence of the falseness
of his accusations, Leviston made an incriminating statement.'0 Only101
then did Leviston receive a Miranda warning. The false accusation and
92. See id. at 426-27.
93. See id. at 427.
94. See id. ("Jopes opened the matchbox, showed the contents to Cervantes
and asked 'What's this?' Cervantes replied, 'That's grass, man.'").
95. See id.
96. See id. (citing Lowe v. U.S., 407 F.2d 1391, 1393-94 (9th Cir. 1969)).
97. See Leviston v. Black, 843 F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir. 1988) (explaining that
this restriction of an interogee's freedom of action must be in connection with the
interrogation itself).
98. See id. at 303 ("Leviston's convictions stem from [a bank] robbery....
Approximately one month after the robbery, Leviston was incarcerated.., due to
an unrelated misdemeanor conviction.... During that time, Officer... Infan-
tino... was told by his commanding officer.., that Leviston had.., asked to
speak with [the police] about the robbery.").
99. See id. ("Infantino... met with Leviston [and] Leviston [implicated two
innocent acquaintances]"); see also supra note 98 and accompanying text.
100. See Leviston, 843 F.2d at 303.
About two weeks later, Infantino ... told Leviston that his story had not
panned out. Witnesses at the bank did not identify [the innocent ac-
quaintances accused by Leviston], and bank photographs of the robber
somewhat resembled Leviston. Infantino said he felt someone was unjus-
tifiably trying to implicate Leviston or that Leviston himself may have
been involved to some degree in the robbery. Leviston then interrupted,
saying, "I'm not going to say I did it, and I'm not going to say I didn't do
it. Nobody's going to lay anything off on Baby Ric." Due to the poten-
tially incriminating nature of this statement, and the fact that the name
"Baby Ric" had come up in Infantino's investigation of the robbery, In-





Jaisle: Constitutional Law—Miranda Means What It Says: Protection against
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
the incriminating statement were introduced at trial.102
The Leviston court ruled that no Miranda warning was required be-
cause, before the false accusation and the incriminating statement, Levis-
ton had not been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way that was additional to his existing impris-
onment. 03 Leviston, like Cervantes, was not under additional constraint,
other than that imposed by his imprisonment for an earlier offense at the
time Leviston requested to speak with police. 1°4 Although Leviston was
not free to leave the prison, he was free to end his conversation with po-
lice at any time and was allowed to leave the interview at his own re-105
quest.
Under Garcia, "additional restraint" must be shown by an added im-
position on the suspect's freedom of movement or an additional restric-
tion on his liberty. Garcia was in jail for a previous offense when a dep-
uty observed smoke and flames coming from Garcia's cell.' 7 The deputy
108extinguished the flames and asked why Garcia set the fire. Garcia said,• - 109
"I no get my canteen.... I got my rights." The court found that before
the deputy queried Garcia about the fire, the deputy did not deprive Gar-
cia of his freedom of action in any way. Garcia's only restriction was
that imposed by his incarceration for a previous offense.' The district
court admitted into evidence Garcia's inculpatory statements absent a112 113
Miranda warning, leading to his first-degree arson conviction. The
Garcia court ruled that Miranda warnings were not required because the
spontaneous question, although accusatorial in tone, did not constitute an
interrogation. The Garcia court noted that factual questioning, such as
general on-the-scene questioning of facts and circumstances surrounding
102. See id.
103. See id. at 304.
104. See id. at 303.
105. See id. at 304 (finding, at the district court level, that Leviston could end
the conversations at will because he had initiated the police inquiry).
106. See Garcia v. Singletary, 13 F.3d 1487, 1492 (11th Cir. 1994) ("To deter-
mine whether prison officials have applied an additional restraint, further restrict-
ing an inmate's freedom and triggering Miranda warnings, courts must consider
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the alleged interrogation.").
107. See id. at 1488-89 (reporting that the deputy entered Garcia's cell, saw a
flaming sheet draped over the sink and saw Garcia adding mattress stuffing to the
fire).
108. See id. at 1489.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 1492.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 1489.
113. See id. (noting that the state's case heavily relied on Garcia's statements).
114. See id. at 1491-92 (noting that the deputy's question was a spontaneous
reaction to a startling event, that the deputy was charged with ensuring inmate
safety and that the deputy did not threaten Garcia or force him to answer).
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a crime, does not necessitate a Miranda warning.115
These cases are readily distinguishable from Tibiatowski. Unlike the
situations in Cervantes and Garcia, Wheeler's questioning of Tibiatowski
did not occur upon discovering evidence of a crime; 1 6 the interview with
Wheeler took place two weeks after the crime." 7 Wheeler's meeting with
Tibiatowski was to discuss his general whereabouts and activities while on
the run, not to discuss a specific event that had just taken place."" Also,
unlike the facts in Garcia, Wheeler's question to Tibiatowski was not spon-
taneous. She asked the question after engaging him in lengthy discussion
and noticing that Tibiatowski seemed bothered and quieter than usual." 9120
In the Leviston case, Leviston initiated the interrogation. Tibiatow-
ski did not initiate an interrogation. In addition, unlike each of these
three cases, Tibiatowski was under an additional restraint. The Tibiatowski
court held that there was no evidence of restraint on Tibiatowski's free-
dom other than that to which he already was subject by reason of his cus-
tody for a prior unrelated offense.'2 Under North Dakota law, however,
Wheeler was to cooperate in sending a delinquent juvenile to another
122state for custody upon the other state's request. Norwig's request on
behalf of Minnesota to hold Tibiatowski and transport him to Minnesota
for questioning provided the basis for the additional restraint on Tibia-
towski's freedom to his restraint for previous North Dakota charges.124
Therefore, Wheeler was obligated to give Tibiatowski a Miranda warning.
2. Additional Support for Additional Restraint
Other relevant U.S. Supreme Court law confirms that "additional re-
straint" must be viewed objectively to give proper force to the Fifth
115. See id. at 1489 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966)).
116. See State v. Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d 305, 307 (Minn. 1999) (stating that
Wheeler's questioning of Tibiatowski took place at a North Dakota juvenile deten-
tion center).
117. See id. at 306-07 (stating that the convenience store robbery took place on
January 31, 1996, and the questioning took place on February 13, 1996).
118. Seeid. at307.
119. See id.
120. See Leviston v. Black, 843 F.2d 302, 303 (8th Cir. 1988).
121. See Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d at 309.
122. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-22-01 (1991) (stating that North Dakota's policy
is to cooperate fully with other states in returning juveniles to another state when-
ever such return is sought); see id. at § 27-22-02 (stating that under the Interstate
Compact on Juveniles, a delinquent juvenile may be sent to another state for cus-
tody, upon the other state's request).
123. See Tibiatowsk 590 N.W.2d at 307.
124. See id. at 306 (noting that Tibiatowski already was incarcerated in the Cass
County Juvenile Detention Center in Fargo, North Dakota, on charges unrelated
to the convenience store robbery).
2000]
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S. 12512Amendment guarantees of Miranda. In Mathis v. U.S., 12 6 the Court em-
phasized, "[w]e find nothing in the Miranda opinion which calls for a cur-
tailment of the warnings to be given persons under interrogation by offi-
cers based on the reason why the person is in custody." In Orozco v.
Texas, the Court stressed, "[f]rom the moment he gave his name, ac-
cording to the testimony of one of the officers, petitioner was not free to
go where he pleased .... ' In Oregon v. Mathiason,'30 the Court found
that the defendant's statement was made voluntarily without a Miranda131
warning. However, the Mathiason facts show that the suspect volun-132 3
teered to be questioned, was told he was not in custody133 and freely left
after his interview.134
Mathis, Orozco and Mathiason support the assertion that Tibiatowski
objectively was under "additional restraint" and entitled to a Miranda
warning. Tibiatowski was in fact "on hold" for Minnesota, similar to the
custody-in-fact situation in Mathis. Like Orozco, Tibiatowski was not free
to go where he pleased from the moment Wheeler received Norwig's mes-
sage. Unlike Mathiason, Tibiatowski did not and could not freely leave
after Wheeler's interview. By operation of North Dakota's laws, Tibiatow-
ski already was under "additional restraint" from the state of Minnesota• . 135
before the Wheeler-Tibiatowski interview. Wheeler should have issued aMiranda warning because Tibiatowski was under an additional restraint.
3. Interogee's Awareness of Additional Restraint
Cervantes,1' 6 Leviston l 7 and Garcia" all require that the interogee be
125. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977); Orozco v. Texas, 394
U.S. 324, 325 (1969); Mathis v. U.S., 391 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968).
126. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
127. Id. at4-5.
128. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
129. Id. at 325.
[O]fficers questioned petitioner about incriminating facts [regarding a
murder in which he was a prime suspect] without first informing him of
his right to remain silent, his right to have the advice of a lawyer before
making any statement, and his right to have a lawyer appointed to assist
him if he could not afford to hire one.
Id. at 326.
130. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).




135. SeeN.D. CENT. CODE§ 27-22-01 (1991).
136. 589 F.2d 424, 428 (1978) (stating that the analysis required is "whether a
reasonable person would believe there had been a restriction of his freedom over
[Vol. 26:1
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aware of any "additional restraint." In Berkemer v. McCarty,'39 the U.S. Su-
preme Court elaborated on the determination of an interogee's awareness
of an "additional restraint."' 4° According to Berkemer, awareness is viewed
from the standpoint of a reasonable person in the interogee's position.
In that case, an officer observed Berkemer's car weaving on a highway andS. 142
stopped him. Berkemer failed a field sobriety test and admitted recent
beer consumption and marijuana use.14 3 The officer then formally ar-
rested Berkemer. 44  The officer admitted that he decided to arrest
Berkemer and charge him with a traffic offense as soon as Berkemer
stepped out of the car.145 Berkemer unsuccessfully sought exclusion of his
admission of alcohol and drug use because the officer did not warn him of
his Fifth Amendment rights. In ruling Berkemer's statement admissi-
ble, the Court stated:
Although [the arresting officer] apparently decided as soon as
respondent stepped out of his car that respondent would be
taken into custody and charged with a traffic offense, [the offi-
cer] never communicated his intention to respondent. A po-
liceman's unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question
whether a suspect was "in custody" at a particular time; the only
relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's posi-
tion would have understood his situation. 
147
The "additional restraint" to which Tibiatowski was subject during his
interview with Wheeler was no "unarticulated plan," as in Berkemer.
Berkemer had reason to believe his arrest was imminent. Tibiatowski had
and above that in his normal prisoner setting").
137. 843 F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that "[t]he relevant inquiry is
whether a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood him-
self to be in custody").
138. 13 F.3d 1487, 1490 (11th Cir. 1994) (considering "whether the prison of-
ficials' conduct would cause 'a reasonable person to believe his freedom of move-
ment had been further diminished'") (quoting Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 429).
139. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
140. See id. at 440-42.
141. See id. at 442.
142. See id. at 423.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 423-24 (noting that the officer transported Berkemer to jail
where he again admitted recent alcohol and drug use).
145. See id. at 423 ("At that point, 'Williams concluded that [Berkemer] would
be charged with a traffic offense and, therefore, his freedom to leave the scene was
terminated.' However, [Berkemer] was not told that he would be taken into cus-
tody.").
146. See id. at 424.
147. Id. at 442.
20001
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no reason for such a belief. He did not know of Minnesota's hold on him.
He met with Wheeler, his North Dakota case manager, in North Dakota
regarding a North Dakota charge unrelated to the Minnesota Travel Mart
robbery. Therefore, the Berkemer analysis does not apply to Tibiatowski.
B. Likelihood of Incrimination on Express Questioning and Voluntariness
On the second issue in Tibiatowski,'" the Minnesota Supreme Court
analyzed Rhode Island v. Innis149 and Arizona v. Mauro150 to determine
whether Wheeler's questioning was express questioning reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response.
To consider the voluntariness of Tibiatowski's statement, the court
relied on a totality-of-the-circumstances test referenced in a number of
Minnesota Supreme Court decisions.151
1. Likelihood of Incrimination
The Innis court viewed the likelihood of incrimination under inter-
rogation as based on whether an interrogator should have known that the
questions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
an interogee. Two police officers, conversing audibly within Innis'
company, discussed the harm that might come to handicapped children
in the area if the children found a searched-for gun. Innis then offered154
to lead police to the hidden weapon. Thus, Innis' supposed "interroga-
tion" comprised merely remarks between police officers in Innis' pres-
ence-remarks that were not even directed at Innis.155 The Innis court
found no likelihood that the suspect would incriminate himself during
148. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
149. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). "We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come
into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning
or its functional equivalent... that the police should know [is] reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 300-01.
150. 481 U.S. 520 (1987). "[I]nterrogation includes a practice-whether ac-
tual questioning or 'its function equivalent'-that the police know is reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from a suspect." Id. (citing Innis, 446 U.S.
at 292).
151. See State v. Jones, 566 N.W.2d 317, 322-23 (Minn. 1997); State v. Hince,
540 N.W.2d 820, 824 (Minn. 1995); State v. Thaggard, 527 N.W.2d 804, 808
(Minn. 1995); State v. Pilcher 472 N.W.2d 327, 333 (Minn. 1991); State v. Hale,
453 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Minn. 1990); State v. Jackson, 351 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Minn.
1984).
152. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 292 (defining interrogation under Miranda as "any
words or actions on the part of the police.., that the police should know are rea-
sonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect").
153. See id. at 291.
154. See id. at 295.
155. See id. at 294-95.
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the police conversation because police directed no express questions to
Innis. 15 6  Also, Innis was well aware of his privilege against self-
incrimination because he had been told repeatedly of his Miranda rights
and waived them before revealing the gun's location to police. 157 The In-
nis Court concluded that no q~uestioning occurred which was likely to
elicit an incriminating response.
In Arizona v. Mauro, the defendant, like Innis, was well-advised of
his Miranda rights while in custody and before he made any incriminating
statements.'6 0 Mauro's "interrogation" was a conversation, tape-recorded
with Mauro's consent, between himself and his wife in a police officer's161
presence. During the Mauros' conversation, his wife agonized over the
recent killing of their son, with which Mauro was charged. Although
the tape recording did not document a specific incriminating statement
by Mauro, the prosecution used the tape to rebut Mauro's insanity de-
fense.16' Like the Innis court, the Mauro court found that Mauro was in-
formed of his Miranda rights before the recording and knowingly waived
those rights.1&
The Tibiatowski court's reliance on Innis and Mauro is misplaced.
With Innis and Mauro as its guide, the Tibiatowski court found that express165
questions are not necessarily interrogation and that Wheeler's "subtle
compulsion" was not enough to trigger a Miranda warning.'66
However, Wheeler should have known that her question was rea-
156. See id. at 292.
157. See id. at 294-95 (noting that the trial court ruled that Innis waived his
Miranda rights, that the arresting patrolman advised him of his rights, that two
other police officers who arrived at the arrest scene, in turn, subsequently twice
again advised him of his rights, and he was again advised of his rights after a
weapon search).
158. See id. at 291 (holding that Innis was not interrogated in violation of his
privilege against self-incrimination under Miranda).
159. 481 U.S. 520 (1987).
160. See id. at 521-22. Mauro was advised of his Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination privilege pursuant to Miranda when arrested for the admitted mur-
der of his son. See id. He was warned again when he was taken to a police station.
See id. at 522. At that point he stated he wanted a lawyer to be present before mak-
ing any more statements. See id.
161. See id. at 522 (recounting that Mauro and his wife were told that their
conversation with each other must be within the observation and hearing of a po-
lice officer, that the recording was made with the knowledge of both spouses and
that no police officer made any comments throughout the couple's conversation).
162. See id. at 522 n.1.
163. See id. at 523.
164. See id. at 527-30 (finding that Mauro voluntarily agreed to the tape record-
ing of his conversation with his wife in the presence of a police officer and that the
Fifth Amendment did not prohibit the use of statements from that conversation at
his trial).
165. See State v. Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d 305, 309 (Minn. 1999)
166. See id. at 310.
20001
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sonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from Tibiatowski.
Wheeler's question was not a casual remark within Tibiatowski's hearing;
it was express and addressed directly to him.16 7 She also knew that Minne-
sota authorities wanted a hold placed on him.""' Yet Wheeler never
warned Tibiatowski to be mindful of the privilege against self-
incrimination during their interview. Tibiatowski had no opportunity to
make an informed waiver because he was not advised of his rights. An in-
terogee unaware of his Miranda rights is less likely to use the privilege
against self-incrimination when directly questioned. 10 Therefore, Innis
and Mauro cannot support the Tibiatowski court's decision.
2. Voluntariness
Once the Tibiatowski court determined that Wheeler's question was
not likely to elicit an incriminating response, it considered whether Tibia-
towski's statement was voluntary. The Tibiatowski court stated that Min-
nesota determines voluntariness through a totality-of-the-circumstances
test (totality test). 72 This test requires that the court weigh such factors as
the interogee's age, maturity, intelligence, education and prior criminal
experience, as well as the adequacy or lack of a Miranda warning.173 The
totality test for juveniles, however, has been questioned.
Even accepting the Minnesota court's reliance on the totality test, it
failed to analyze factors on the record which would justify its conclusion175
that Tibiatowski's situation met the test. The court's decision particu-
167. See id. (stating that only Tibiatowski and Wheeler were present during the
interview, that she noted he seemed "bothered" and quieter than usual, and that
she asked him directly "if there was anything he wanted to tell" her).
168. See id. at 307.
169. See id. (observing that Wheeler did not give Tibiatowski a formal Miranda
warning, even after he blurted out his incriminating statement and questioned his
legal status).
170. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966) (noting that a defendant
cannot make a statement by his own free choice unless he has been apprised of
the Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination).
171. See Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d at 310.
172. See id. ("Minnesota applies federal constitutional standards through a to-
tality-of-the-circumstances test to determine the voluntariness of a suspect's state-
ment.").
173. See State v. Jones, 566 N.W.2d 317, 322-23 (Minn. 1997); State v. Hince,
540 N.W.2d 820, 824 (Minn. 1995); State v. Thaggard, 527 N.W.2d 804, 808
(Minn. 1995); State v. Pilcher 472 N.W.2d 327, 333 (Minn. 1991).
174. A 1995 study of police interrogations of juveniles assessed the workability
of the totality test. See Lawrence Schlamm, Police Interrogation of Children and State
Constitutions: Why Not Videotape the MTV Generation , 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 901 (1995).
The study questioned the reliability of the totality test for failing to establish clear
guidelines for police interrogation ofjuveniles and allowing undue judicial discre-
tion. See id. at 912-14.
175. See Tibiatowsk 590 N.W.2d at 307.
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larly fails to consider the lack of a Miranda warning, which would have al-
lowed Tibiatowski to knowingly decide whether to waive those rights.1
7
6
Like the weavers of invisible cloth in The Emperor's New Clothes,177 the Tibia-
towski court attempted to create support for an argument that fails. That
is, the court proffers a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis woven with in-
visible thread.
Also absent is consideration of the totality test in light of the U.S. Su-
preme Court decision, Fare v. Michael C. 178 The Michael C. Court applied a
totality test to the voluntariness of ajuvenile's statement.79 A crucial issue
considered by the Michael C. Court in applying the totality test was
whether Michael C. understood and voluntarily waived his rights before
questioning:
Thus, the determination whether statements obtained during
custodial interrogation are admissible against the accused is to
be made upon an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation, to ascertain whether the accused in
fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forgo his rights to remain si-80
lent and to have the assistance of counsel. ... The totality approach
permits-indeed, it mandates-inquiry into all the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation of the
juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelli-
gence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warn-
ings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the con-
sequences of waiving those rights.'8'
176. See id.
177. HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES (visited Sept. 18,
1999) <http://www.geocites.com/Athens/2424/clothes.html>. Scoundrels bilk a
clothes-conscious king by "weaving" a non-existent cloth, supposedly invisible to
the ignorant and incompetent. See id. A young child who "could only see things as
his eyes showed them to him" publicly announced the king's nakedness. See id.
178. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
179. See id. at 725.
This totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to determine
whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is
involved. We discern no persuasive reasons why any other approach is
required where the question is whether ajuvenile has waived his rights, as
opposed to whether an adult has done so.
Id.
180. Id. at 724-25 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-77
(1966) (emphasis added)).
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The Michael C. Court found that the interrogating officers ensured
that the suspect understood all of his Miranda rights and that the suspect
willingly waived those rights. 18  Under this analysis, Tibiatowski's state-
ment was not voluntary because he was not informed of his Miranda rights
and thereby accorded the opportunity to voluntarily waive them. His
statement should have been excluded.
Based on an analysis of Tibiatowski's facts under Innis and Mauro,
Tibiatowski was entitled to a Miranda warning because Wheeler's express
questioning of Tibiatowski was likely to elicit an incriminating response.
Further, because Tibiatowski was not informed of his Miranda rights, he
did not make a voluntary statement.
C. Wheeler's Official Capacity
On the third issue that the Minnesota Supreme Court considered in
Tibiatowski,183 the court erred in determining that Wheeler was not a law
enforcement officer at the time she questioned Tibiatowski. i" The Tibia-
towski court stated: "Wheeler did not visit respondent as an agent for or at
the request of the Moorhead [Minnesota] police as respondent contends.
The meeting between respondent and Wheeler had been scheduled well
before the Moorhead police phoned Wheeler about their interest in re-
spondent .... *"85
However, by operation of North Dakota law, Wheeler was acting on
behalf of Minnesota authorities, not when she made the appointment to
meet Tibiatowski, but as soon as she received Norwig's request for a hold
on Tibiatowski.' 86
The Tibiatowski court decided Wheeler's official capacity without
considering the following U.S. Supreme Court decision, Estelle v. Smith."
7
In Estelle, the Court looked beyond the formal title of "law enforcement
officer" to whether the interrogator used the power of the state to elicit an
incriminating response. Smith, accused of murder, underwent a court-
ordered pre-trial psychiatric exam to determine his competency to stand
182. See Michael C., 442 U.S. at 726.
183. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
184. See State v. Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d 305, 311 (Minn. 1999).
185. Id. This case was not the first time that the Minnesota Supreme Court
addressed this issue. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 324 N.W.2d 340 (Minn. 1982),
rev'd, 465 U.S. 420 (1984). In the state case, the court found that a probation offi-
cer's questioning of a defendant was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response, and therefore required a Miranda warning. See id. at 343. The U.S. Su-
preme Court reversed the decision, focusing instead on the custodial setting and
not the probation officer's status. See Murphy, 430 U.S. at 430.
186. See supra note 6 for a discussion of a North Dakota official's obligation to
act on behalf of other states seeking juveniles for questioning.
187. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
188. See id. at 456-60.
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trial.' 89 Before the exam, the psychiatrist, Dr. Grigson, failed to give Smith
a Miranda warning.' 9° Smith was convicted and, based only on Grigson's
testimony that Smith was a "severe sociopath," was sentenced to death."'
The Estelle court faulted Grigson and the prosecution for failing to give192
Smith a Miranda warning prior to the psychiatric exam. Because Grig-
son used the power of the state to elicit an incriminating response, his
failure to issue Smith a Miranda warnin resulted in the exclusion of Grig-
son's testimony in Smith's resentencing.
Wheeler did not initially arrange her visit with Tibiatowski so that she' 94
was functioning as an agent of the Minnesota police. By the time she
visited Tibiatowski, however, she was aware of Minnesota's additional re-
straint on Tibiatowski.195 When Wheeler visited Tibiatowski, she was a de
facto agent of North Dakota and Minnesota authorities. Wheeler, like
Grigson, used the power of the state to elicit an incriminating response
without advising the interogee of his privilege against self-incrimination.
According to the Estelle analysis, Wheeler should have been considered an
agent of North Dakota and Minnesota.19 6 Under Miranda, then, Wheeler
was obligated to warn Tibiatowski of his Fifth Amendment rights.
189. See id. at 454 (stating that the examining psychiatrist confirmed Smith's
competency to stand trial and assist in his own defense).
190. See id. at 460 (noting that, before the psychiatric exam, Smith received no
advice -concerning his right to silence).
191. See id. Dr. Grigson testified before the jury on direct examination: (a)
that Smith "is a very severe sociopath;" (b) that "he will continue his previous be-
havior;" (c) that his sociopathic condition will "only get worse;" (d) that he has no
"regard for another human being's property or for their life, regardless of who it
may be;" (e) that "[t]here is no treatment, no medicine . .. that in any way at all
modifies or changes this behavior;" (f) that he "is going to go ahead and commit
other similar or same criminal acts if given the opportunity to do so;" and (g) that
he "has no remorse or sorrow for what he has done .... " Id. at 459-60. Dr. Grig-
son, whose testimony was based on information derived from his 90-minute "men-
tal status examination" of Smith was the state's only witness at the sentencing hear-
ing. See id. at 460 (citations omitted).
192. See id. at 461-63 ("[T]he State's attempt to establish respondent's future
dangerousness by relying on the statements he made to Dr. Grigson similarly in-
fringes Fifth Amendment values.").
193. See id. at 473 (vacating respondent's death sentence because respondent's
Fifth Amendment rights were abridged when the state introduced Dr. Grigson's
testimony at the penalty phase).
194. See State v. Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d 305, 307 (Minn. 1999) (noting that
Wheeler arranged her visit with Tibiatowski before she heard from Norwig).
195. See id.
196. See supra note 6 for a discussion of a North Dakota official's obligation to
act on behalf of other states seekingjuveniles for questioning.
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V. CONCLUSION
The essence of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination is to require the state to independently produce evidence of
the person's guilt, not to coerce the evidence from the accused person.197
The privilege against self-incrimination is so vital to the individual, and
the ease in reciting these rights so simple, that there is no reason for fail-
ing to give Miranda warnings to ajuvenile custodial interogee.
When Wheeler questioned Tibiatowski, he was under an additional
restraint. Furthermore, Wheeler was cloaked with the authority of the
state and her questioning elicited an incriminating response from Tibia-
towski. Wheeler should have given Tibiatowski a Fifth Amendment
Miranda warning. Absent that warning, Tibiatowski's confession was in-
voluntary and should have been excluded.
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